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The Constitution to The Constitution
(Excerpted from essay originally published as The Ordeal 
and the Constitution and lightly edited for coherence.)
mary sarah bilder
THE Ideological Origins won the Bancroft and the Pulitzerprizes, but when I see Bernard Bailyn, we don’t talk about
that book.1 It was, of course, brilliant, but I think of it as an
artistic study for the book published seven years later, The Or-
deal of Thomas Hutchinson.2 Ideological Origins accomplished
all sorts of things—investigating under-appreciated sources,
laying out the revolutionaries’ ideas, recovering the way that
arguments shifted and grew—but it did not worry overly about
recapturing the uncertainty of the moment. Years later, Bailyn
would revisit politics and the creative imagination to empha-
size that these “aspirations had no certain outcomes,” but in
Ideological Origins there was a certain inevitability.3 Indeed,
Bailyn noted that there were articulate opponents, but “the
future lay not” with such men.4 He bluntly called them, “the
losers.”5
Only in The Ordeal would Bailyn focus on these losers and,
in doing so, come to articulate the historian’s quest: to see “the
A shorter version appeared as an online reflection for Harvard University Press:
http://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_publicity/2017/04/bernard-bailyns-ideological
-origins-at-fifty.html (April 2017).
1Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967; enlarged edition, 1992).
2Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1974).
3Bernard Bailyn, “Politics and the Creative Imagination,” To Begin the World Anew:
The Genius and Ambiguities of the American Founders (New York: Alfred Knopf,
2003), 5.
4Bailyn, Ideological Origins, xiv.
5Bailyn, The Ordeal, Appendix, 383; Bernard Bailyn, “The Losers,” Sometimes an
Art: Nine Essays on History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015), 109.
The New England Quarterly, vol. XCI, no. 1 (March 2018). C© 2018 by The New England Quarterly.
All rights reserved. doi:10.1162/TNEQ_a_00663.
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latent limitations within which everyone involved was obliged
to act; the inescapable boundaries of action; the blindness of
the actors—in a word, the tragedy of the event.”6 Without first
writing Ideological Origins, Bailyn never would have written
The Ordeal. It is The Ordeal that we return repeatedly to talk
about and the fundamental historical problem of how to see
the past in the moment in which the actors do not know what
is going to happen—which arguments will win, which will lose,
and which will come to be so important that they will obscure
all other possibilities.
This insistence on the reality that people in the past could not
see the future animated my exploration of Madison’s Notes. In
Madison’s Hand, I explained that “Madison’s Notes recorded
one man’s view of the writing of a constitution in which the
politics and process of drafting the document deferred com-
prehension of the Constitution as a unified text.”7 The docu-
ment that emerged out of the Convention in 1787 embodied
these limitations and boundaries. Indeed, I have come to be-
lieve that the very concept of The Constitution postdated the
Convention. In the penultimate paragraph, I wrote “The Con-
vention could not see the Constitution until the final days.”8
And, over the first decade, “the Constitution survived and in-
deed began to become the Constitution.”9 These sentences be-
gan to take the Bailyn insight in a slightly different direction.
What if we see the Constitution, not as the product of winning
arguments, but still caught in this moment in which multiple
possibilities could enfold.
In this brief essay, I return to Bailyn’s discussion of the idea of 
constitution in Ideological Origins and offer some thoughts on 
when did the Constitution become The Constitution.
                                               ****
6Bailyn, The Ordeal, ix.
7Mary Sarah Bilder,Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 3.
8Bilder, Madison’s Hand, 240.
9Bilder, Madison’s Hand, 240.
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The discussion of constitutionalism scattered throughout 
Ideological Origins may be one of the book’s most important 
lasting influences. Bailyn centered the Revolution on “consti-
tution”: “The word ‘constitution’ and the concept behind it 
was of central importance to the colonists’ political thought; 
their entire understanding of the crisis in Anglo-American re-
lations rested upon it.”24 This idea was not our constitution 
but a small “c” constitution: “the constituted—that is existing—
arrangement of government institutions, laws, and customs to-
gether with the principles and goals that animated them.”25 For 
Bailyn, before the 1760s, the written or unwritten character-
istic did not matter, but rather the absence of a focus on a 
“constitution” as a marking an outer boundary for ordinary leg-
islation. Thus, starting with the 1760s, Bailyn traced a line 
through James Otis and others to one of his favorite docu-
ments, Four Letters on Important Subjects. There, in 1776—
coincidentally with independence—he found statements that 
explicitly recognized that the “primary function of a constitu-
tion was to mark out the boundaries of governmental power.”26 
Ideological Origins traced a subtle and significant transforma-
tion in constitutionalism. It was not small “c” to big “C” consti-
tutionalism, or unwritten to written constitutionalism; rather, it 
was existing embodied arrangement to boundary.
Subsequent work on transatlantic and imperial constitution-
alism suggests that constitution as boundary concept articulated
24Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 67.
25Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 68, 175.
26Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 182. Bailyn intended to include “Four Letters” as one
of the final pamphlets in the proposed fourth volume of Pamphlets of the American
Revolution. Pamphlets of the American Revolution, ed. Bernard Bailyn, (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 1:752. When I took Bailyn’s “History of the Con-
stitution” class as a third-year law student at Harvard in 1990, this letter was in the
reading materials. I have long included it in my American Legal History for Lawyers
reader. Mary Sarah Bilder, American Legal History for Lawyers (privately printed: The
Bilder Press, 2017). Whether Thomas Paine was the author of Four Letters remains in
dispute. For attribution argument, see A. Owen Aldridge, Tom Paine’s American Ide-
ology (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984); Gary Berton, Smiljana Petrovic,
Lubomir Ivanov, Robert Schiaffino, “Examining the Thomas Paine Corpus: Automated
Computer Authorship Attribution Methodology applied to Thomas Paine’s Writings,”
New Directions in Thomas Paine Studies, ed. Scott Clear and Ivy Lindon Stabell (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 31, 40–42.
THE ORDEAL AND THE CONSTITUTION 137
theoretically in the pamphlets has antecedents: the structural
mechanisms of Privy Council control (e.g., disallowance and
the negative); the language of written charters (e.g., repug-
nancy, as if born in England language); and the practice of lo-
cating colonial authority in written charters and other English
grants.27 Bailyn suggested that the pressure of debate “forced
apart, along the seam of basic ambiguity,” what he described
as “two contrasting concepts of constitutionalism that have re-
mained characteristic of England and America ever since.”28
I am not sure that Bailyn meant that, there and then, the
two concepts suddenly became apparent and distinguishable.
Perhaps what one sees by 1776 is the recognition that, over
a century, understandings of “constitution” on one side of the
Atlantic had slowly and subtly shifted to be incompatible with
those on the other. In retrospect, it seems implicit that the
earlier idea of constitution must have included the idea of a
boundary—and yet boundary was not the part that was focused
on. But once “constitution” becomes articulated explicitly and
theoretically explicated as boundary, particularly in a moment
when the idea of boundary becomes an explanation for political
legitimacy, it becomes impossible to go back.
A great gap exists between constitution as boundary and the
concept that we have in the twenty-first century of our Con-
stitution. As Lewis Namier wrote with respect to the politics
of this period: “Between them and the politics of the present
day[,] there is more resemblance in outer forms and denomina-
tions than in underlying realities; so that misconception is very
27See, e.g., Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution; Christopher Tomlins, Freedom
Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580–1865
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Alison LaCroix, Ideological Origins of
Federalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Daniel J. Hulsebosch,
Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the At-
lantic World, 1664–1830 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005);
Mary Sarah Bilder, “Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law,” Transforma-
tions in American Legal History: Essays in Honor of Morton J. Horwitz, ed. Alfred L.
Brophy and Daniel W. Hamilton (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009),
28–57; Lauren Benton, “Constitutions and Empires,” Law & Social Inquiry 31 (2006):
177–98.
28Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 67.
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easy.”29 Our concept of the Constitution is not an easily defin-
able thing but, if we were to analogize to chemistry, it is more
like a compound—or perhaps even a creature—comprised of a
large group of elements or even molecules glommed together.
We know that some of these elements develop in the period
between 1776 and 1786 when the states begin to write new
governing documents. But even though we can find examples
of documents that contain our ideas of Constitution, there are
always exceptions—losers—that we should consider. The lack
of concern in Connecticut and Rhode Island about state con-
stitutions that are colonial charters serves as a caution about
the completeness of transformation.
The first constitution—the Articles of Confederation—is
analogous to Thomas Hutchinson. It is written but based on
assumptions about the continuation of unwritten governance
practices of a “firm league of friendship.”30 It is drafted by a
regular committee of Congress and ratified by ordinary leg-
islative processes.31 It creates a government of one branch. It
contains no judiciary. It explicates no interpretive mechanism.
But it was called a constitution.32 In 1786, Congress asked the
states to send delegates to “render the federal Constitution”—
the document or perhaps even the government under it—
“adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation
of the Union.”33 In 1787, James Madison began his notes at the
Philadelphia Convention with the same phrase. May 14, 1787,
was the day for the meeting for “revising the federal Constitu-
tion.”34
29Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, 2nd ed.
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968), x (from the 1928 preface).
30Articles of Confederation, art. III in [Act of Confederation of the United States
of American], Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, ed. John
Kaminski, et al. (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976–2013), 1:86
(hereafter referred to as DHRC).
31DHRC, 1:78.
32Julian Boyd, “The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union,” Old South
Leaflets Nos. 228–229, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Boston: Old South Association, 1960), 3–4.
33Resolution of Congress, February 21, 1787, DHRC, 8:45.
34Documentary History of the Constitution, 1786–1870 (Washington, DC: Depart-
ment of State, 1894–1905), 3:7–9, (hereafter referred to as DHC); Bilder, Madison’s
Hand, 15.
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Indeed, one of the most striking revisions made by Madison,
some years after the Convention, was to cross out this word
“Constitution” and replace it with “system of Government.”35
Madison’s original notes show that “Constitution” came, even-
tually, to mean the document arising in the fall of 1787 as dis-
tinguished from pre-1787 documents. But this distinction arose
in hindsight and it incorporated understandings that arose af-
ter 1787 in the process of ratifying, disputing, interpreting, and
living under the 1787 Constitution.
In the Convention, the focus was on stabilizing the coun-
try nationally and internationally, addressing the specific prob-
lems of the Articles, and creating a working government. The
roughly two-thirds of the Convention between May and early
August involved the great debates over fundamental structure:
representation in Congress (entirely proportional or propor-
tional/equal state suffrage); representation of slavery (political
power based on free inhabitants only or counting numbers of
enslaved people or adopting the three-fifths clause); role of
the Senate (as an advisory executive council or upper house);
conception of the executive (committee or individual); mecha-
nism to enforce constitutional boundaries (council of revision,
congressional negative, or judiciary). And even then, there re-
mained profound, unresolved structural issues—for example,
the process by which to select the executive or the aspiration of
Madison that the congressional negative could be resurrected.
We often misread and misinterpret the last third of the Con-
vention because we focus on the origins of the document that
finally emerged. Jane Butzner—later more well known as Jane
Jacobs—published a wonderful book in 1941, Constitutional
Chaff: Rejected Suggestions of the Constitutional Convention of
1787. It is a collection of losers. It is a “compendium of ideas”
that fell by the wayside or were rejected. Butzner’s book, more
than any narrative account, captures the breadth of possibility
in the Convention.36
35DHC, 3:7.
36Jane Butzner, Constitutional Chaff: Rejected Suggestions of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), 4.
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When did the draft even look substantially like the Consti-
tution? Not in August: the twenty-three articles could have
been merged—or not—to form all sorts of different constitu-
tional arrangements.37 In fact, the Convention proceeded se-
quentially in debating them, a reality that is more obvious in
the way Madison arranged his Notes than in modern compila-
tions.38 As they debated the August 6 printed draft, Madison
at least recorded himself arguing repeatedly for the constitu-
tion to be broad in its language, open to legislative discretion.39
Moreover, the August 6 draft contained structures that went to
the core of our understanding of basic constitutional concepts
like separation of powers. Congress elected the President. The
Senate alone appointed the Supreme Court and made treaties.
Congressional powers—to pay debts, provide for defense and
general welfare—had not been specified. There was no Vice
President. Six committees between August 18 and September
8 resolved critical issues. The most important—the Committee
on postponed matters—did not finish reporting until Septem-
ber 5.40
The extant paper record provides glimpses of this broader
struggle to solve problems. A group of delegates tried to track
some of the changes on their printed August 6 drafts but few
took extensive notes. Madison sustained for a while his practice
of rewriting his contemporaneous rough notes but the Notes
became rough by August 21. And stopped completely on Au-
gust 22—the date to which Madison would later return to com-
plete using his copy of the Convention journal. The decisions
that mattered increasingly occurred in committees.41
37Draft Constitution by the Committee of Detail, August 6, 1787, DHRC, 1:260–69.
38Bilder, Madison’s Hand, 122.
39Bilder, Madison’s Hand, 127–30.
40DHRC, 270–84 (reconstructed revisions of draft); Bilder, Madison’s Hand, 142–
45; John R. Vile, “The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787,” American Journal of Legal History 48 (2006): 147–76.
41Bilder, Madison’s Hand, pp. 141–153. For a list of the seventeen extant copies
of the August 6 draft, see Mary Sarah Bilder, “How Bad were the Original Records
of the Federal Convention?” George Washington Law Review 80, (2012): 1620,
1656.
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Until Wednesday, September 12, when the Convention saw
the new printed draft, the Constitution did not resemble the
document we know. The committee’s report was described as
“the Constitution as revised and arranged.”42 Only with this
draft—read over and agreed to by Saturday—did the Consti-
tution have the seven articles that thematically emphasize an
interpretive framework in which separation of powers and fed-
eralism can loom large. The fundamental structure of the Con-
stitution we know emerged only at the last possible moment.
How deeply did anyone other than lead drafter Gouverneur
Morris and perhaps the other committee members (Alexan-
der Hamilton, William Samuel Johnson, Rufus King, and James
Madison) grasp the interpretive shift that would arise from re-
ducing the draft to seven articles? Indeed, could Morris himself
even have glimpsed the rhetoric and ideology that would arise
from the rearrangement?
Conversely, regardless of how they understood the Constitu-
tion, they voted unanimously—to reject a committee to prepare
a bill of rights. A multitude of explanations likely underpinned
this decision ranging from pragmatic exhaustion to theoretical
incoherence. The draft already incorporated two of the rights
associated with Magna Carta (trial by jury in criminal cases and
habeas corpus) as well as rights associated with due process (no
bills of attainder or ex post facto laws) and religious liberty (no
religious test for office).43 Indeed, if one adds the bar on cor-
ruption of the blood for treason and the ban on titles on nobil-
ity, the draft contained a strikingly robust list of rights, albeit
not in the form of a “bill.” And yet the embrace of a Consti-
tution without a list of individual protections from government
emphasizes the distance from our modern concept.
The Convention in September 1787 was focused on an ar-
rangement designed to stabilize the Union. The same “com-
mittee of revision” that prepared the September 12 draft
42DHC, 1:194; DHRC, 1:284–85.
43DHC, 1:194 (journal entry describes motion for a “Committee to prepare a Bill of
rights”). For summary of the standard explanation, see Richard Beeman, Plain Honest
Men: The Making of the American Constitution (New York: Random House, 2009),
341–44.
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(conventionally called the committee of style) also prepared a
letter to Congress.44 The Convention approved the letter para-
graph by paragraph before turning to the final draft of the Con-
stitution. The letter to Congress was a statement of the intent
of the Convention. It is arguably the only official explanation—
perhaps statement of original intention—left by the Conven-
tion. It echoes and parallels the Preamble of the Constitution
and describes a Constitution to “promote the lasting welfare
of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and
happiness.” The preamble similarly states: “promote the gen-
eral welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity.”45
Although the letter is usually relegated to at most a brief
mention, its brevity meant that it was likely read widely when
it appeared published alongside the text in newspapers in
September and October 1787. Official publications reprinted
it with the Constitution.46 It emphasized the fundamental di-
vergence from the world under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. The letter explained that in “all our deliberations” it had
kept “steadily in our view” one thing: “the consolidation of our
Union.” To achieve this end of consolidation, “rights of inde-
pendent sovereignty” had to be surrendered. The Convention
insisted on the imperfection of the document in this respect:
“[i]t is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line.”
But “it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have
been expected.”47
But even in this letter, the word Constitution is slightly am-
biguous and carries the older meaning. The Convention sub-
mits “that Constitution which has appeared to us the most
adviseable.” The Constitution here is still as much an arrange-
ment as it is a specific document or boundary. It is still as much
44DHRC, 1:305–306; see Daniel A. Farber, “The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover
Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding,” Michigan
Law Review 94 (1995): 615–50.
45DHRC, 1:306.
46See Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 70.
47DHRC, 1:305–306.
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a constitution of a “general government of the Union” as it is
the Constitution of the United States. In the letter, the Con-
stitution is a particular institutional arrangement to “promote
the lasting welfare.”48 Indeed, even in the Preamble, the clos-
ing words—“do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America”—describe Constitution as something
to be established, not drafted or written. Even here, in the most
familiar section of our Constitution, we can hear that the mod-
ern meaning of Constitution has not yet triumphed.
And why should it have? We can retell the history of the Con-
stitution from 1787 to 1789 not as fulfillment of the process of
the Constitution’s creation but as the creation of the very idea
of a large-C Constitution. Each moment in which the Consti-
tution triumphs is a moment in which there was a loser. Not
a loser of political ideology but a loser of a certain concept of
what the Constitution was.
They did not know that the Convention would be followed
by public ratification. They thought it plausible—possibly even
likely—that Congress would view the Constitution as a re-
port; debate it; revise it—and then decide what to do. James
Madison and others raced from Philadelphia to New York to
be in Congress to debate what to do next with the Constitu-
tion.49 A Constitution altered by Congress or even approved by
Congress is conceptually different from a Constitution written
by an independent Convention ratified at popular conventions.
They did not know that the Constitution would be rati-
fied and ratified without amendments—in essence, they did
not know that the Constitution would remain the document
that they drafted. Pauline Maier’s Ratification emphasized the
repeated contingencies on which ratification depended. Mas-
sachusetts and, in particular, John Hancock played pivotal
roles. As Bailyn explained, “Convinced that ratification with-
out amendments of some kind is impossible, Federalist leaders
reach agreement with Hancock on a compromise proposal.”50
48DHRC, 1:305–306.
49See Maier, Ratification, 52–59; Bilder, Madison’s Hand, 155.
50Bailyn, The Debate on the Constitution, 1:1095–1096.
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Hancock had arisen from his sick bed—likely due to a com-
bination of flattery and political promises of support in future
gubernatorial elections. With the support of Samuel Adams,
Hancock argued for ratification with recommended amend-
ments. But the amendments were to be proposed in Congress
after the Constitution was technically ratified and the new
government began to operate. Hancock’s appearance success-
fully shifted the dynamic in the Massachusetts Convention.
The precedent would become the example followed by other
states.51
They did not know that the Constitution would be amended
with the original text left intact. In 1789, Madison pro-
posed amendments; they became what we know today as
the Bill of Rights. Madison wanted the amendments inter-
woven with the original text. He thought the amendments
should literally revise the Constitution. After an “ingenious and
interesting” debate, Congress decided amendments should be
supplemental.52 Only at this moment, two years after the con-
vention, did it become apparent that the 1787 text would re-
main visually intact. If the Constitution had been amended by
internal revision—Madison’s preference—a different interpre-
tive tradition would have developed.
They did not know that the judiciary would be the exclusive
interpreter. They knew the judiciary would interpret the Con-
stitution. They expected it to have the judicial power to void
legislation.53 But the judiciary’s approach to the constitutional
interpretation was itself the product of a series of decisions,
some established by the Judiciary Act (1789) and others by the
early justices as in the refusal to hear pension claims.54 Indeed,
perhaps not until Chisolm v. Georgia (1793)—perhaps not even
51See Maier, Ratification, 155–213. Maier speculates on motives at 192–98.
52See Bilder, Madison’s Hand, 175–76; Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documen-
tary Record from the First Federal Congress, ed. Helen E. Veit et al. (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1991), xv.
53Mary Sarah Bilder, “The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal
116, (2006): 502, 546–55.
54Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see William R. Casto, The
Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver
Ellsworth (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Saul Cornell and
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then—is it entirely apparent that the Court would read the text
of the Constitution so closely.55
When does the Constitution become The Constitution? I
don’t know. Certainly by the later 1790s, the written document
seems to be increasingly emphasized. So famously in Marbury
v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall could repeatedly re-
fer to the “written constitution.”56 And yet the old meanings
were not entirely lost. Connecticut kept its colonial charter as
its constitution until 1818. Rhode Island likewise retained its
colonial charter until 1843. For nearly seventy years after the
Revolution, Rhode Island survived with a constitution granted
by a king in 1663. The Constitution of 1787 as it actually was
in 1787 remains slightly outside of our vision.
It is this quest to which Bailyn has repeatedly returned. As
he wrote in Sometimes an Art, “The past is a different world,
and we seek to understand it as it actually was.” The problem,
however, is that “[k]nowing the outcome, we feel it to be our
obligation to show the process by which the known eventual-
ity came about.”57 It is impossible to recapture the past pre-
cisely: the extant historical record favors the paths that won
because those records are saved; the historical profession favors
histories that are relevant in explaining how our world came
to be; the general public prefers popular histories in which
people in corsets and breeches struggle with recognizable ver-
sions of modern problems. But as the historian ages, the central
quest becomes ever more interesting. The historian realizes
that the world changes in ways that are unpredictable. And
yet, moments after unexpected events, people are already revis-
ing their memories to persuade themselves that they knew the
outcome.
Gerald Leonard, “The Consolidation of the Early Federal System, 1791–1812,” in The
Cambridge History of Law in America, ed. Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tom-
lins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1:518–54.
55See Maeva Marcus, “The Constitution’s Court,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
ser., 69 (2012): 373–76, and “The Effect (or Non-Effect) of Founders on the Supreme
Court Bench,” George Washington Law Review 80 (2012): 1794.
56Marbury v.Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803); Bilder, The Transatlantic Con-
stitution, 195.
57Bailyn, Sometimes an Art, 22, 24.
146 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY
The Ordeal stands as a critical reminder of the historian’s
need to strive to see the different past. Hutchinson was a
loser—and a rather unsympathetic one at that—but in the
grand arc of history, we all are likely losers on one matter or
other. And in those moments of loss, of confusion, of bewil-
derment, of sensing ourselves standing on the losers’ side, we
glimpse the historian’s grail. We are reminded to see the past
by studying carefully the losing shadows.
Mary Sarah Bilder is Founders Professor, Boston College Law
School and holds a courtesy appointment in the History De-
partment of Boston College.
